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This research aims to look at how firm characteristics and audit
quality can affect the earning management practices in
the Egyptian context, within the period of 2011–2019. This period
was after the Egyptian revolution and has not been well
investigated in Egypt, especially after the new release of corporate
governance rules for listing firms. A sample of 157 non-financial
listed companies in the Egyptian stock exchange is selected for
achieving the research objective through analysing their financial
reports. The panel least squares, using the fixed-effect model, is
used to test the hypotheses and investigate the relationship
between discretional accruals and firm characteristics, where
the dependent variable is the earnings management, measured
by the discretionary accruals and the independent variables are
the firm characteristics (size, financial leverage, age, survival and
audit quality). The results illustrate that the relationship between
a firm’s financial leverage and earnings management is positive.
This study may help the firms to control their financial leverage
for avoiding any earnings management practice. The stakeholders
should notice such significant firm characteristics in making their
own decisions, especially after the COVID-19 pandemic crisis,
which may expectedly increase the firm financial leverage, and in
turn, some earning management practices can be used intentionally
to hide the bad firm performance.
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the relationship of corporate governance practices
on earnings management in the Egyptian capital
market and among developing markets, in general,
found that there is a significant relationship
between both (Boghdady, 2019; Abdou, Ellelly,
Elamer, Hussainey, & Yazdifar, 2020).
Accordingly, the authors find it of great
interest to investigate how firm characteristics
did impact a firm’s earning management during
the Egyptian revolution, 2011, and the issuance
of the most recent corporate governance code
(CG code). The effectiveness of this code will also be
tested during such a critical period and thus,
recommendations can be made for its future
amendment to be more eligible in facing any other
crisis such as the global COVID-19 pandemic crisis
of 2019.
Thus, this study’s main contribution to
the limited research on earnings management in
emerging markets is to investigate the relationship
between
firm
characteristics
and
earnings
management in a developing country, Egypt.
In addition, it will focus on five main types of firm
characteristics: firm size, firm financial leverage,
firm age, firm’s audit quality, and firm survival for
the post-revolution period 2011–2019.
Accordingly, the findings of the paper will
provide regulators and policymakers with a clear
picture of problem areas related to earnings
management within the CG code, and it will help
them to enhance any future CG code updates to
decrease such practices. The research will also be
useful for all stakeholders, including corporate
managers, banks, shareholders, government, and
creditors in making their own decisions, especially
after the COVID-19 pandemic crisis, which may
expectedly increase a firm’s financial leverage. Thus,
earning management practices may increase in order
to boost a company’s financial records and image.
This paper starts with a literature review
and hypothesis development in Section 2. Section 3
outlines the research methodology. Section 4
discusses the results, and Section 5 concludes
the paper and offers recommendations for further
research.

1. INTRODUCTION
Enron, WorldCom, and Xerox are amongst those in
Europe and the USA who were involved in corporate
accounting misconducts during the 21st century.
The core of these scandals was mainly the
phenomenon of earnings management (Goncharov,
2005). The accounting and audit industry has been
criticized both globally and in the USA because this
phenomenon resulted in the collapse of these firms
(Alareeni & Branson, 2013). Kim and Yoon (2009)
argue that company managers’ main aims are to
maintain the running of the business by securing its
finances, so external parties can gain the benefits
they need from the business. Uwuigbe, Uwuigbe,
and Bernard (2015) explain that managers create
a positive image for the company they work for by
exercising earnings management (Giosi, Caiffa,
Pera, & Ferro, 2017; Alsharairi & Iqtait, 2017; Kolsi &
Attayah, 2017). Consequently, stakeholders doubt
the credibility and reliability of the financial reports.
Due to this, investors and stakeholders value
financial reporting that of the highest quality
because it reduces information asymmetry, as
Jensen and Meckling (1976) mention. Additionally,
quality financial reporting gives a company’s users
more trust in them so that they can take effective
business decisions, and it also gives users a positive
reflection of the company (Wawero & Riro, 2013).
Watts and Zimmerman (1978) also add that highquality financial reporting enables a company to be
more transparent, as well as contributing to more
reliable contracts. In this context, Shuli (2011)
confirms that earnings management does decrease
an investor’s trust and confidence in a company
because its financial reporting is not honest.
Focusing on the Egyptian context, there tend
to be many limitations in comparison to developed
markets. Hassan (2008) mentions that Egyptian
firms follow the Egyptian accounting standards (EAS)
in their financial reporting processes, which is
mainly based on IFRS, with a few exceptions. Kamel
and Elbanna (2010) point out that following IFRS
does not guarantee law enforcement, especially
when earnings management practices are well
accepted among Egyptian firms. Additionally, in this
regard, Farag (2009) refers to the low level of
conformity with financial accounting and taxation
Egyptian standards. Moreover, Khalil (2010) states
that the Egyptian Corporate Governance Code is
unbinding, which is a major limitation, specifically
in an environment where law enforcement is weak.
Consequently, strong managers may be encouraged
to manipulate earnings because the accounting
policies and practices allow too much flexibility
(Garrouch, Hadriche, & Omri, 2014; Houcine &
Halaoua, 2017).
Moreover, referring to the impact of
the Egyptian revolution on listed firms’ earnings
management, Abdallah (2018) argues that the Egyptian
revolution financial crisis, initiated in 2011, adversely
impacted reported earnings and the Egyptian
Exchange (EGX) performance, shook investor
confidence and caused many listed EGX firms to fail.
Since the Egyptian revolution and the updated
Egyptian Corporate Governance Code, there have
been few literature studies on how a company’s
characteristics can impact earning management
practices. However, numerous studies examining

2. LITERATURE
DEVELOPMENT

REVIEW

AND

HYPOTHESES

Many previous literature studies investigated
the determinants of earnings management (EM)
(Wijaya, Pirzada, & Fanady, 2020; Ado, Rashid,
Mustapha, & Ademola, 2020; Nyoka, 2018).
In developed countries within Europe and in
the USA, studies have investigated the effect of firmspecific characteristics on EM, yet in these countries,
investors and financial statement users are generally
covered by the legal system where the level of
transparency in a company is expected to be very
high (Pincus & Rajgopal, 2002; Anagnostopoulou &
Tsekrekos, 2017; Anagnostopoulou, Gounopoulos,
Malikov, & Pham, 2021) While research has covered
developed countries, limited research has been done
with regards to the impact of firm characteristics on
earnings management in emerging markets
(Mostafa 2018).
In Egypt, despite the intensive efforts that have
been exerted by the Egyptian Government towards
the corporate governance reform, the Egyptian
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capital market still faces many limitations. Egyptian
firms are operating under an unbinding corporate
governance code, and this enables companies to
practice earnings management. In other words,
organizations can manipulate their finances to look
better to stakeholders because the Egyptian
accounting standards are overly flexible to allow such
manipulation. Metawee (2013) and Abdul Rahman
and Ali (2006) state that earnings management falls
in line with the GAAP (Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles), which means it is not classed
as an act of fraud. However, even though it is not
classed as fraud, earnings management still leads
stakeholders and investors to be misled about
the image and information of the company.
Focusing on Egypt, and despite the Egyptian
Corporate Governance Code not being legally
binding, several studies investigated the impact of
corporate governance mechanisms (as a determinant)
on earnings management. Findings indicate that
a significant relationship exists between different
corporate governance mechanisms and earnings
management (Aleqab & Ighnaim, 2021; Ebaid, 2013;
Hassan, Soliman, Ragab, & Rageb, 2020). In 2011,
after the Egyptian revolution, the Egyptian Government
attempted to enhance corporate governance by
introducing a new code of corporate governance,
seeking to keep up to date with the best practices at
the international and regional levels (Cigna, Djuric, &
Sigheartau, 2017). In this context, Egyptian literature
does not attempt to study the impact of the most
recent Egyptian Corporate Governance Code, issued
in 2011, on earnings management. The most
up-to-date study by Bassiouny (2016) examined
the relationship between firm characteristics
(as a determinant) and earnings management.
However, the researcher used data for the period
2007–2011, which is before the issuance of the most
recent Egyptian Corporate Governance Code and
before the revolution.
Due to the lack of research on earnings
management in emerging companies, this study aims
to investigate organizations in Egypt, a developing
country, and how a firm’s five main characteristics,
firm size, age, financial leverage, audit quality,
and company survival, impact earning management
practices. Furthermore, this study will focus
specifically on the years 2011–2019 (post-Egyptian
revolution).

Watts and Zimmerman (1986) predicted that
firm size is negatively associated with earnings
quality because larger firms would make incomedecreasing accounting method choices in response
to greater political/regulatory scrutiny. More recent
studies (Wuryani, 2012, Behrghani and Pajoohi,
2013, Swastika, 2013, in Indonesia; Hassan and
Farouk, 2014, Yasser and Soliman, 2018, in Egypt;
Khanh and Khuong, 2018, Matonti, Iuliano, Palazzi,
and Tucker, 2021, in Italy) found that larger
organizations have tighter internal controls than
smaller firms, which assist in decreasing financial
manipulation. Furthermore, large companies tend
to be audited by one of the four famous and more
reputable auditing firms, which means that they are
less likely to be involved in financial manipulation
and their reliability will increase. Thus, the company
is far less likely to be involved in earnings
management.
On the other side, the size of the company has
a positive relationship with earnings management
because large companies face more pressures to
meet the analysts’ expectations (Ali, Noor, Khurshid, &
Mahmood, 2015; Uwuigbe et al., 2015; Asim & Ismail,
2019; Nalarreason, Sutrisno, & Mardiati, 2019;
Trang & Mai, 2021). Additionally, large-sized firms
have greater bargaining power with auditors, which
can enable them to negotiate with auditors.
Another group of studies concludes there is
no relationship between firm size and earnings
management practices. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997),
Bassiouny (2016), El Deeb and Ramadan (2020) in
Egypt, and Alareeni (2018) in GCC (Gulf Cooperation
Council), found that whether a company is big or
small, earnings management can still take place
because all businesses will do anything to avoid
a loss or decline in profits. To conclude, a body
of the accounting literature has investigated
the relationship between firm size characteristics
and earnings management practices, and the results,
as shown above, are inconsistent as documented by
Siregar and Utama (2008). Based on such literature
review discussion, the following first hypothesis is
formulated to test the effect of firm size on EM
practices in Egypt as follows:
H1: There is a significant relationship between
firm size and earnings management.

2.2. Firm age and earnings management

2.1. The size of a company on earnings management

Prior research, such as Akhtaruddin (2005) and Gul,
Fung, and Jaggi (2009), suggest that older companies
are more established in the market, and as they have
worked hard to build up their reputation, they are
more eager to protect it. Furthermore, they have
more experience in the business and are more aware
of the policies and procedures that govern their
company. As a result, older organizations have fewer
earnings management. Adding to this opinion,
Alsaeed (2006) states that older firms have higher
quality financial reporting processes because of
their long experience in the market, and
Akhtaruddin (2005) states that older companies are
less likely to involve themselves in earnings
management practices.
Additionally, DeAngelo (1981) argues that
companies that have been established for longer are
more likely to be audited by bigger and more
reputable audit firms, who themselves want to

Generally, the determinants of earning management
and their impacts are still a controversial topic
(Trang & Mai, 2021). Accordingly, literature studies
argue about the impact of firm size on the quality of
reported information. Ball and Foster (1982), as well
as Meek, Roa, and Skousen (2007), state that, as per
the asymmetry theory, big companies have stronger
governance and controls; therefore, they have
a lower existence of asymmetry. Thus, this leads
to a decrease in earnings management practice.
In contrast, Jensen and Meckling (1976) stated that,
as per the agency theory, large-sized organizations
have larger agency costs, which means an increase in
opportunistic practices. In addition, Doyle, Ge,
and McVay (2007), Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and
Kinney (2007) mentioned that small companies are
more prone to weaker internal control, thus, they are
more likely to manipulate their reported earnings.

167

Corporate Governance and Organizational Behavior Review / Volume 5, Issue 2, Special Issue, 2021

protect their own image and reliability, thus are
driven to report any financial misstatements.
Moreover, Chalaki, Didar, and Riahinezhad (2012)
mention that governmental agencies monitor older
organizations more than new ones and as a result,
the companies are less likely to manipulate financial
reports.
On the other hand, other studies, such as Ideh,
Jeroh, and Ebiaghan (2021) and Khanh and Khuong
(2018), contradict the above opinions. They state
that in the Nigerian context, there is a positive
relationship between firm age and earnings
management. In addition, Marchellina and Firnanti
(2021), as well as Teymouri and Sadeghi (2020),
in Tehran, find no significant relationship between
firm age and earnings management interpreting that
companies that are just starting to operate are not
recognized to be more aggressive in performing
earnings management in order to avoid earnings
losses.
To conclude, findings seem to contradict
the relationship between firm age and earnings
management. Thus, the second tested hypothesis is:
H2: There is a significant relationship between
firm age and earnings management.

2.3. Firm’s financial
management

leverage

and

Based on the previous studies (Farouk &
Hassan, 2014; Soliman & Ragab, 2014; Shirzad &
Haghighi, 2015; Ado et al., 2020; Amake & Akogo,
2021), these authors state that organizations that
are high in leverage, in fact, decrease the ability
for a manager to manipulate earnings and increase
accruals. This negative relationship between
a company’s financial leverage and earnings
management is based on two reasons. Firstly,
managers will not have availability to cash because if
the company is in leverage, they are bound to debt
repayment. Secondly, Jensen (1986) illustrates that
a company is bound to a lender-induced spending
restriction if they employ debt financing.
On the contrary, Ardison, Martinez, and Galdi
(2013), Uwuigbe et al. (2015), Jang and Kim (2017)
in Korea, Alareeni (2018) in GCC countries, except
for Oman, Ghani, Azemi, and Puspitasari (2019) in
Malaysia, find no significant relationship between
financial leverage and earning management.
Accordingly, the findings are inconclusive as to
the impact of firm financial leverage on earnings
management. In this context, the third hypothesis is
as follows:
H3: There is a significant relationship between
firm financial leverage and earnings management.

earnings

2.4. Firm survival and earnings management

Bowen, DuCharme, and Shores (1995) stated that for
decreasing the debt covenant costs, managers may
try to make their financial reports seem more
attractive so that the company has more
creditworthiness. As a result, they will adopt specific
accounting methods that give them more room to do
this, proving the relationship between the debt level
and the choice of accounting policy. Additionally,
Waweru and Riro (2013) mention that debt covenant
amounts are devised on what has been reported in
the accounting numbers, so in order to hide debt,
it will impose extra costs on the organization.
Consequently, companies may practice earnings
management to reduce the image of any financial
distress (Easton, Eddey, & Trevor, 1993).
The financial distress theory by Fung and
Goodwin (2013) examines organizations in financial
bother. The authors state that in order to persuade
their creditors that their financial bother is
a temporary phase, managers are more likely to
manipulate earnings to seem more reliable.
Furthermore, as per the information asymmetry
theory (Beck, Frost, & Jones, 2013), larger loans
do not have as much asymmetry because the fixed
costs of finding out information about a borrower is
not an obstacle. The theory suggests that there is
a higher asymmetry of information for small loans,
therefore, loan size is positively correlated with its
borrower’s size. Beatty and Weber (2003) state that
when an organization is in debt, managers select
certain accounting policies that increase its revenue,
so they can abide by any debt covenants imposed on
them by banks and bondholders. This way, they can
prevent any renegotiation costs. Some studies, such
as Yasser and Soliman (2018) in Egypt, Dang et al.
(2018), Asim and Ismail (2019) in Pakistan,
Nalarreason et al. (2019) in Indonesia, Teymouri and
Sadeghi (2020) in Tehran, and Matonti et al. (2021)
in Italy, claim that companies that have higher debt
financing practice earnings management, thus, there
is a significantly positive relationship.

Many previous studies have investigated the
relationship between firm survival and earnings
management (Nwaobia, Kwarbai, and Fregene, 2019,
in Nigeria, Anagnostopoulou et al., 2021, in the UK).
Others used it as a control variable, such as
Bassiouny (2016) in the Egyptian context, Hassan
and Ahmed (2012) and Nwaobia et al. (2019) in
Nigeria, find that the firm survival has a negative
significant impact on earning management.
Accordingly, the impact of firm survival on earnings
management is studied in this paper. Consequently,
the fourth hypothesis is formulated as follows:
H4: There is a significant relationship between
firms’ survival and earnings management.

2.5. Audit quality and earnings management
Alsughayer (2021) points that as time passes there
tends to be a growing literature on audit quality
mainly due to its importance. Literature studies used
many proxies for audit quality, however, in this
paper, audit quality is measured in terms of whether
the listed company is measured by one of the big
four companies or not. In this regard, DeAngelo
(1981) states that a high-quality audit is more likely
to detect and report errors and irregularities,
thus serving as an effective barrier to earnings
manipulations.
Watts and Zimmerman (1983) stress that
auditing reduces agency costs and asymmetries
between managers and shareholders and acts as
a monitoring method used by firms. Rusmin (2010)
and Chung et al. (2005) confirm that the four big
auditing firms aim to maintain a high audit quality
due to having a numerous number of clients, besides
having better resources such as technology, training
programs, and experience. Their main concern is
protecting their reputation, which might be lost if
a misstatement or manipulation is not reported.
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Many studies that have investigated the impact
of audit quality and earnings management have been
highly debatable. Swastika (2013) in Indonesia,
Soliman and Ragab (2014), Susanto, Pradipta, and
Djashan (2017), and El Deeb and Ramadan (2020) in
Egypt, find a negative significant relationship with
earnings management because audit quality helps to
minimize earnings management problems arising
from free cash flow. Other prior research has shown
a positive association between audit quality and
earnings management (Alzoubi, 2018; Ghosh &
Moon, 2005; Gul et al., 2009; Rusmin, 2010).
On the other hand, studies such as Yasar (2013)
and Shams (2021) find that with regard to
discretionary accruals, the quality of an audit has no
effect. Therefore, it does not matter which audit firm
audits a company. In other words, whether it is one
of the four big auditing firms or not, it makes
no difference in terms of decreasing earnings
management. Piot and Janin (2007) and Alhadab
and Clacher (2018) also agree with this finding.
Consequently, the fifth hypothesis is:
H5: There is a significant relationship between
firms’ audit quality and earnings management.

3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.1. The sample
The sample used in the study is the non-financial
companies listed on the Egyptian stock exchange for
the period from 2011 until 2019. It is selected using
the purposive (or selective) sampling technique. It is
a non-probability sample, which the researchers
have selected, based on the characteristics of
the population for achieving the objective of
the study (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013). There was a total
of 260 listed companies in February 2020. After
excluding the banks and financial institutions that
have different corporate governance code and
regulations, and the companies that do not have
sufficient financial reports on December 31,
the total final selected companies, under the study,
reaches 157 companies, from different industries,
during an eight-year period (2011–2019). Thus,
the number of observations is 1,395 firm-year
observations (157 firms × 9 years). Table 1 presents
the industry breakdown of the sample. This table
shows that the industrial economic sector is studied,
as it plays a vital role in the Egyptian economy.

Table 1. Industry breakdown
Industry type
Accommodation and food services
Administrative, waste management and remediation services
Agriculture, fishing and hunting
Construction
Educational services
Health care and social assistance
Information
Manufacturing
Mining, quarrying, and oil and gas extraction
Real estate and rental and leasing
Retail trade
Transportation and warehousing
Utilities
Whole sale trade
Total selected companies

No. of companies
11
1
8
17
2
2
5
80
6
16
2
4
1
2
157

% of the sample
7%
0.6%
5%
10.8%
1.3%
1.3%
3%
51%
4%
10%
1.3%
2.5%
0.6%
1.3%

model, is used to test the research hypotheses.
The advantages of using panel data are that it gives
a lot of information, has more variability and
less collinearity than other variables. Therefore,
its results are more trustworthy and unbiased
(Baltagi, 2011). The Jarque-Bera test is used for
testing the normality of the research variables;
the group unit root is also used for testing
stationary in a time series, in addition to the EngleGranger test for cointegration and the correlated
random effect Hausman test.

3.2. Measurement of the key variables
The data needed for measuring the key variables
were obtained from the Thomson Reuters Eikon
database. Table 2 presents the measurement tools
used for the dependent and independent variables.
The panel data analysis is the statistical method is
used here for analyzing two-dimensional (typically
cross-sectional and longitudinal) data, as it assumes
that firms are heterogeneous. Panel data models are
either fixed-effects or random-effects models.
The panel least squares, using the fixed-effect

Table 2. Measurement of the variables
Variables
“Discretionary accruals
“Firm size (FSIZE)
“Firm financial leverage (FLEV)
“Firm age (FAGE)
“Audit quality (AUQUL)
“Survival (FSUR)

Measuring tool
“Dependent variable
Modified Jones model
“Independent variables
Natural log of total assets
Total debt ratio (Total debt/Total equity)
Log of the number of years since the firm’s foundation
Dummy variable, 1 if the auditor is a Big 4 firm and 0 otherwise
Dummy variable, 1 if a firm is active in a year and 0 otherwise
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to calculate the total accruals. Accordingly, the total
accruals can be calculated as follows:

3.2.1. Measurement of the dependent variable
Earnings management (EM) is used as a dependent
variable in this study. As per most of the recent
earnings management literature, this study uses
discretionary accruals (DAs) as a proxy for earnings
management. Most researchers prefer to use
the cash flow statement approach as it is more
useful than the balance sheet approach (Shah,
Butt, & Hasan, 2009; Soliman & Ragab, 2014). Total
accruals are calculated using the balance sheet
approach as the change in current assets (excluding
cash items) minus the change in current liabilities
(excluding the current portion of long-term debt)
minus
depreciation.
The
cash-flow-statement
approach, on the other hand, calculates total
accruals as the difference between earnings before
extraordinary items and discontinued operations
and operating cash flows. According to Hribar and
Collins (2002), the cash flow statement approach is
more reliable. They discovered that studies that use
a balance sheet approach to test for earnings
management may be contaminated by measurement
error in accruals estimates. If the partitioning
variable used to indicate the presence of earnings
management is correlated with the occurrence of
mergers and acquisitions or discontinued operations,
tests will be biased, and researchers will be led to
believe that earnings management occurs when it
does not. Additional findings reveal that errors in
estimating balance sheet accruals can skew returns
regressions with discretionary and non-discretionary
accruals as explanatory factors. Although the
modified Jones model considers the possibility of
manipulating accounts receivable during the event
period, it ignores this fact during the estimation
period, resulting in calculation inconsistency (El Diri,
2018). This implies that using cash sales in both
periods, rather than just the event period, is a better
approach and can alleviate the simultaneity problem
caused by having accounts receivable on both sides
of the equation (Ronen & Yaari, 2008). Consequently,
this study will use the cash flow statement approach

𝑇𝐴𝑡 = 𝑁𝐼𝑡 − 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡

(1)

where, TAt: total accruals in year t; NIt: net income
in year t; CFOt: cash flows from operating activities
in year t.
Total accruals are not the proxy for earnings
management; on the contrary, earnings management
is the part of the accruals that managers can have
control over and are able to practice manipulations.
According to this, the total accruals are divided into
two parts, which are the discretionary accruals
and the non-discretionary accruals. So, to calculate
the discretionary accruals, non-discretionary accruals
are subtracted from total accruals (Shah et al., 2009).

𝑇𝐴 = 𝐷𝐴 + 𝑁𝐷𝐴

(2)

where:
TA: total accruals;
DA: discretionary accruals;
NDA: non-discretionary accruals.
Many models and methods exist to calculate
the discretionary accruals, the Healy 1985 model,
the DeAngelo 1986 model, Jones 1991 model and
finally the modified cross sectional Jones 1995
model (Callao, Jarne, & Wróblewski, 2017). Previous
studies reported that the modified Jones 1995
model is the best measurement of DA and the most
common model in estimating the DA (Dechow,
Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995; Francis, Maydew, & Sparks,
1999; Saleh & Ahmed, 2005; Alareeni & Branson,
2013; Uwuigbe, Fagbemi, & Anusiem, 2012; Atieh &
Hussain, 2012; Walker, 2013; Alareeni & Aljuaidi,
2014; Uwuigbe, Ranti, & Sunday, 2014; Ipino &
Parbonetti, 2016; Nam & Park, 2016; Alareeni, 2018).
Consequently, based on the modified Jones 1995
model, that this study uses, the equation to be used
in calculating the NDA is as follows (Uwuigbe et al.,
2015; Shah et al., 2009):

𝑁𝐷𝐴𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑗 [1/𝐴𝑡−1 ] + 𝛽2𝑗 [𝛥𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡 − 𝛥𝐴𝑅𝑡/𝐴𝑡−1 ] + 𝛽3𝑗 [𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡 /𝐴𝑡−1 ]

(3)

PPEt: gross properties, plants, and equipment for
firm j in year t;
β1j, β2j, β3j are firm-specific parameters.
In order to find the firm-specific parameters to
be used in the NDA equation, a regression equation
is used to find those parameters and this equation is
as follows (Ahmad, Anjum, & Azeem, 2014; Salleh &
Haat, 2014; Uwuigbe et al., 2015):

where:
NDAt: non-discretionary accruals for firm j in year t;
At-1: total assets for firm j in year t–1;
ΔREVt: change in the revenues (sales) for firm j in
year t less revenue in year t–1;
ΔARt: change in accounts receivables for firm j in
year t less receivable in year t–1;

𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑡 /𝐴𝑡−1 = 𝛽1𝑗 [1/𝐴𝑡−1 ] + 𝛽2𝑗 [(𝛥𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡 – 𝛥𝐴𝑅𝑡 )]/ 𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑗 [𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡 /𝐴𝑡−1 ] + 𝜀𝑡
The equation of the modified Jones 1995 model,
the discretionary accruals can be calculated using

(4)

the following equation (González & García-Meca,
2014; Salleh & Haat, 2014; Uwuigbe et al., 2015):

𝐷𝐴𝑗𝑡 = 𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑗𝑡 /𝐴𝑗𝑡−1 – 𝑁𝐷𝐴𝑗𝑡

(5)

accordance with the previous studies (Chen, Elder, &
Hsieh, 2007; Hassan & Ahmed, 2012; Llukani, 2013;
Hassan & Farouk, 2014; Bassiouny, 2016; Habbash &
Alghamdi, 2016; Hamdan, Buallay, & Alareeni, 2017;
Alareeni, 2018). Firm financial leverage (FLEV) is
calculated by the total debt-to-equity ratio (Waweru
& Riro, 2013; Llukani, 2013; Jang & Kim, 2017). Firm

3.2.2. Measurement of the independent variable
The independent variables that are used in this
study are the specific firm’s characteristics (FSIZE,
FLEV, FAGE, AUQUL, and FSUR), and these are used
to examine their effects on EM practices. FSIZE is
measured by the natural log of total assets, in
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audit quality is measured by the auditor if it is one
of the Big 4 firms (Chen et al., 2007).

model to examine and test for the impact of
multiple independent variables, which are the firm
characteristics on the dependent variable, which is
the earnings management practice in the 157 most
active non-financial firms in the Egyptian stock
exchange.

3.3. Model specification
To test the hypotheses, this research uses the panel
data type and the following multiple regression

(6)

𝐷𝐴𝐶 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽2 𝐹𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝛽3 𝐹𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝛽4 𝐴𝑈𝑄𝑈𝐿 + 𝛽5 𝐹𝑆𝑈𝑅 + 𝜀
where:
DAC: the discretionary accrual;
FSIZE: the firm’s size;
FLEV: the firm’s financial leverage;
FAGE: the firm’s age;
AUQUL: the audit quality;
FSUR: the survival variable and the ε is the error term;
ε is the error term.
The dependent variable is the discretionary
accruals for each firm based on the modified Jones
1995 model, which was developed by Dechow et al.
(1995). The independent variables are the firm
characteristics in terms of firm size, firm financial
leverage, firm age, firm audit quality, and firm
survival.

variables in terms of DA, firm age, firm size, and
firm financial leverage are not normally distributed
as the probability associated with their JB test is
significantly less than 0.05. Since the Pearson
skewness coefficient is less than or equal to 1 or
greater than or equal to –1 (–1 ≤ PSC ≤ 1), it can be
concluded that the data are not significantly skewed
(Bluman, 2012).
From Table 3 results, it is shown that the mean
value of DA is 0.024 with the minimum value is
found to be –0.50 and the maximum is 0.67, which
indicates a significant range. The natural logarithm
of firm size mean value is 13.5 with a minimum
value of 9.9 and a maximum value of 18.1. The firm
financial leverage mean value is 23.8%, which is
a good percentage for the investigated companies
with a minimum value of 0 and a maximum value
of 97.7%. The firm age mean value is 30 years with
a minimum of 0 years and a maximum of 71 years.
From Table 4 it is found that:
 Firm survival: The statistics show 98% of
these selected companies are active in the market
for the investigated period (2011–2019).
 Firm audit quality: 28% of the companies
have external auditors from one of the Big 4 audit
firms.

4. DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS
4.1. Descriptive analysis

4.1.1. Jarque-Bera test
To measure the normal distribution of all research
panel data, in terms of dependent and independent
variables, the Jarque-Bera (JB) normality test is used
in this research. According to Table 3, the research

Table 3. Descriptive analysis
Statistics
Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum
Std. Dev.
Skewness
Kurtosis
Jarque-Bera
Probability
Observations

DA
0.024074
0.012989
0.673283
-0.497570
0.125248
1.028987
8.089059
1751.526
0.000000
1395

LNF_SIZE
13.57749
13.51254
18.10760
9.935288
1.668198
0.259022
2.579600
25.87183
0.000002
1395

FLEV
23.87622
12.07000
97.67000
0.000000
27.21073
0.952035
2.689298
216.3422
0.000000
1395

FAGE
30.49104
28.00000
71.00000
0.000000
15.41942
0.557392
2.562289
83.37072
0.000000
1395

Table 4. Frequency table for the firm audit quality and firm survival independent variables
Variables
Firm audit quality
Firm survival

0
1
0
1

(if
(if
(if
(if

Dummy variable
the auditor is not one of Big 4 firms)”
the auditor is one of the Big 4 firms)”
a firm is inactive)
a firm is active in a year)

Frequency
1000
395
23
1372

Percent
71.7
28.3
1.6
98.4

the covariance value between two time periods
does not depend on the actual time, but rather
depends only on the distance between the two time
periods. The covariance is computed for DA, firm
size, firm leverage, firm age, audit quality, and
survival in Table 5.

4.1.2. Group unit root test
Time series are stationary if they do not have a trend
or seasonal effects. The stationary in a time series is
studied by using the unit root test. The reason is to
ensure that the mean and variance are constant and
do not change over time, and also that
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Table 5. Group unit root test for all the dependent and independent variables
Group unit root test: Summary.
Series: DA, LNF_SIZE, FLEV, FAGE, AUQUL, FSUR.
Sample: 1395.
Exogenous variables: Individual effects.
Automatic selection of maximum lags.
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 1 to 13.
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel.
Method
Statistic
Prob.**
Cross-sections
Obs.
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)
Levin-Lin-Chu test*
-8.31510
0.0000
6
8328
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat. (IPSW)
-21.4675
0.0000
6
8328
ADF — Fisher Chi-square
458.183
0.0000
6
8328
PP — Fisher Chi-square
672.051
0.0000
6
8364
Notes: ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic
normality.

The Table 5 results revealed the stationary of
the time series of the DA, firm size, firm leverage,
firm age, audit quality, and firm survival at level 1 > 0
based on the constant level, due to the following
criteria: Levin-Lin-Chu, IPSW, PP, ADF, at a significance
level less than 0.05.

be stationary if the variables are cointegrated.
Accordingly, it is used here to measure if there
are long-run equilibrium relationships between
the nonstationary time series variables in terms of
DA, firm size, firm leverage, and firm age, audit
quality, and firm survival in Table 6 as follows:

4.1.3. Cointegrating equation model
Engle-Granger cointegration test indicates that
the residual of the cointegrating regression should
Table 6. Cointegration test for the dependent and independent variables
Series: DA, LNF_SIZE, FLEV, FAGE, AUQUL, FSUR.
Sample: 1 1395.
Included observations: 1395.
Null hypothesis: Series are not cointegrated.
Cointegrating equation deterministics: C.
Automatic lags specification based on Schwarz criterion (maxlag = 23).
Dependent
Tau-statistic
Prob.*
DA
-15.93899
0.0000
LNF_SIZE
-10.09284
0.0000
FLEV
-12.68869
0.0000
FAGE
-8.286853
0.0000
AUQUL
-8.829590
0.0000
FSUR
-4.974258
0.0246
Note: * MacKinnon (1996) p-values.

From Table 6, it is found that there are longterm equilibrium relationships between the variables
DA, firm size, firm leverage, and firm age, audit
quality, and firm survival, based on the tau-statistic
and z-statistic, at a significance level less than 0.05.

Z-statistic
-625.0886
-193.1063
-364.8601
-137.5604
-297.4646
-102.9139

Prob.*
0.0001
0.0000
0.0001
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

and firm characteristics variables. The correlation
coefficients have been checked to find out if there is
high multi-collinearity among variables or not.
The highest correlation coefficient is equal to 0.51
between
DA
and
firm
financial
leverage.
This coefficient is less than 80%, thus, there is
no multicollinearity problem that can affect
the interpretation of regression coefficients of
the independent variables in this model (Murtagh &
Heck, 1987).

4.2. Correlation analysis
This study uses the Pearson correlation to measure
the correlations between the earnings management

Table 7. Pearson correlation matrix between the control variables with the ROA
Covariance analysis: Ordinary.
Sample: 2011–2019.
Included observations: 1395.
Probability
DA

DA
LNF_SIZE
1.000000
-0.32327
1.000000
LNF_SIZE
0.0000
—
0.51032
0.206135
FLEV
0.0000
0.0000
-0.4186
-0.091141
FAGE
0.0000
0.0007
0.028886
0.403478
AUQUL
0.2810
0.0000
-0.159228
-0.010772
FSUR
0.0000
0.6877
Note: * Significant at a level less than 0.05.

Correlation
FLEV

1.000000
—
-0.030919
0.2485
0.208451
0.0000
0.008685
0.7459
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FAGE

1.000000
—
-0.164745
0.0000
0.157880
0.0000

AUQUL

1.000000
—
-0.118545
0.0000

FSUR

1.000000
—
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To test the research hypotheses, the correlation
results from Table 7 can be used as follows:
1. There is a negative significant relationship
between DA and firm size at a significant level less
than 0.05. Thus, H1 is accepted.
2. There is a negative significant relationship
between DA and firm age at a significant level less
than 0.05. Thus, H2 is accepted.
3. There is a positive significant relationship
between DA and firm financial leverage at a significant
level less than 0.05. Thus, H3 is accepted.
4. There is a negative significant relationship
between DA and firm survival at a significant level
less than 0.05. Thus, H4 is accepted.
5. There is no relationship between DA and
audit quality. Thus, H5 is rejected.
In terms of DA, firm size, firm age, and firm
survival have a negative relationship. However, there
is a positive relationship between DA and a company’s
financial leverage. Audit quality has no effect on DA.
The acceptance of H1 and the significance of
the firm size effect on discretional accruals is
consistent with the findings of other studies
(Rangan, 1998; Naser, Al-Khatib, & Karbhari, 2002;
Lee & Choi, 2002; Xie, Davidson, & DaDalt, 2003;
Glaum & Street, 2003; Kim, Liu, & Rhee, 2003;
Abdul Rahman & Ali, 2006; Akhtaruddin, 2005;
Wuryani, 2012; Behrghani & Pajoohi, 2013; Swastika,
2013; Hassan & Farouk, 2014; Yasser & Soliman, 2018;
Khanh & Khuong, 2018; Matonti et al., 2021).
Companies that are medium or large have more
room to report positive changes in earnings rather
than positive earnings; therefore, they may partake
in earnings management to avoid reporting a decline
in revenue. On the contrary, small organizations will
find it harder to manipulate their earnings due to
having a lower revenue. In other words, they will
easily get caught because their income is lower.
When the firm size increases, the manager’s
engagement in managing accruals decreases, as they
are being monitored by external parties and their
performance is relatively stable (Ahmad et al., 2014).
On the other hand, Myers, Myers, and Skinner
(2007), Kim et al. (2003), Gray and Clarke (2008),
Athanasakou, Strong, and Walker (2009), Naz, Bhatti,
Ghafoor, and Khan (2011), Atieh and Hussain (2012),
Rahmani and Akbari (2013), Ali et al. (2015),
Uwuigbe et al. (2015), Asim and Ismail (2019), and
Nalarreason et al. (2019), find that the firm size has
a positive impact on earnings management. Based on
the agency theory, large-sized firms have greater
agency costs, and, in turn, more opportunistic
practices. Large firms have more bargaining power
to negotiate with the auditors, which makes it easier
to manipulate the earnings. They also face more
investors and financial analysts’ pressure to show
earnings increments and meet their expectations.
Other studies suggested that relationships do not
exist. Waweru and Riro (2013) in Kenya, Llukani
(2013) in Albania, Bassiouny (2016) in Egypt, El Deeb
and Ramadan (2020) in Egypt, and Alareeni (2018) in
GCC, find that the firm size has an insignificant
impact on earnings management, which in turn goes
against the opinion that bigger companies are more
tempted to manage their income.
In terms of the firm age result and
the acceptance of H2, Akhtaruddin (2005), Alsaeed

(2006), and Gul et al. (2009) believe that the older
the company, the less likely they are to involve
themselves in
earnings management.
When
a company becomes well-known and reputable to
the public, they want to protect the image they have
built over time. They gain experience and as a result,
they have better financial reporting practices and
follow the company’s policies and procedures in
order to maintain their high standard. However, this
result is inconsistent with Olowokure, Tanko, and
Nyor (2015) and Teymouri and Sadeghi (2020), who
find that there is no relationship between firm age
and earrings management. In addition, Khanh and
Khuong (2018) reveal a positive association between
firm age and earnings management.
The significance of the firm financial leverage
relationship with the earnings management
result (H3), is consistent with that of Waweru and
Riro (2013), Bekiris and Duokakis (2011), Fung
and Goodwin (2013), Hassan and Farouk (2014),
Bassiouny (2016), Xu and Ji (2016), Anagnostopoulou
and Tsekrekos (2017), Yasser and Soliman (2018),
Asim and Ismail (2019), Nalarreason et al. (2019),
Teymouri and Sadeghi (2020), and Matonti et al.
(2021). In accordance with the signaling theory,
managers of highly leveraged firms would engage in
earnings management and employ discretionary
accruals to have reports that will enable them to
attract more capital at reasonable rates and avoid
debt covenant violation (Klein, 2002; Jiang, Lee, &
Anandarajan, 2008). In contrast, Ardison et al.
(2013), Uwuigbe et al. (2015), Jang and Kim (2017),
Alareeni (2018) find that the firm leverage has
an insignificant impact on earnings management
practices. On the other hand, Aivazian, Ge, and
Qiu (2005), Jelinek (2007), López-Iturriaga and
Saona Hoffmann (2005), Farouk and Hassan (2014),
Soliman and Ragab (2014), Shirzad and Haghighi
(2015), Ado et al. (2020), and Amake and
Akogo (2021) find a negative significant relationship
as the highly leveraged firms may limit managers’
ability to manipulate income and increasing accruals.
The acceptance of H4, that the firm survival
has a negative significant impact on earning
management, is consistent with Hassan and Ahmed
(2012) and Nwaobia et al. (2019). EM practices can
affect the firm performance, in a way that threatens
its survival. Hassan and Ahmed (2012) had
submitted that firm performance and shareholders’
wealth are affected by earnings management, which
by extension constitutes a threat to an entity’s going
concerned and eventual survival. Solvency and
liquidity are two of the most important key
indicators of a company’s survival (Nwaobia &
Jayeoba, 2016). These refer to the firm’s ability
to pay its debts as they become due, whether in
the short or long term. If a company’s resources are
insufficient to meet long-term debts, it may be able
to meet its obligations in the short term but face
long-term solvency problems. Thus, long-term
solvency and financial stability are important
determinants of a company’s risk of failure due to
its inability to meet its obligations. Any manipulated
accrual-based financial information that exceeds
the “normal” bounds permitted by the accounting
framework poses a risk. Whatever name they go by,
“earnings management”, “innovative accounting”, or
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“creative accounting”, they deviate from the rules of
standard accounting practices (Hosho, Matowanyika,
& Chinoda, 2013), and lead to low earnings quality
and do not fairly approximate cash flows. In such
a scenario, managing liquid resources is likely
to be difficult, and the organization’s survival is
jeopardised due to the likely disconnect between
profits and cash flows (Nwaobia et al., 2019).
The rejection of H5 and the insignificance of
the audit quality effect is consistent with Piot and
Janin (2007) and Alhadab and Clacher (2018), who
find evidence that the presence of high-quality
auditors does not constrain all forms of earnings
management but it may constraint the manipulation
of discretionary accruals. However, this finding is
inconsistent with that of Swastika (2013) in
Indonesia, Soliman and Ragab (2014) in Egypt,

Susanto et al. (2017), and El Deeb and Ramadan
(2020) in Egypt, who find a negative significant
relationship with earnings management as audit
quality can reduce earnings management problems
arising from free cash flow. Some prior research has
shown a positive association between audit quality
and earnings management (Alzoubi, 2018; Ghosh &
Moon, 2005; Gul et al., 2009; Rusmin, 2010).

4.3. Kao residual cointegration test
The Kao test, as shown in Table 8, follows the same
basic approach as the Pedroni test, but specifies
cross-section specific intercepts and homogeneous
coefficients on the first-stage regressors under
the null hypothesis of no cointegration for panel data.

Table 8. Kao residual cointegration test for panel data
Series: DA, LNF_SIZE, FLEV, FAGE, AUQUL, FSUR.
Sample: 2011–2019.
Included observations: 1395.
Null hypothesis: No cointegration.
Trend assumption: No deterministic trend.
User-specified lag length: 1.
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel.
T-statistic
ADF
-7.571234
Residual variance
0.024446
HAC variance
0.011820

According to Table 8, it can be revealed that
there are long-term equilibrium relationships among
the dependent and independent variables of
the panel data model (firm size, age, leverage, audit
quality, and firm survival), based on the Kao-statistic,
at a significant level less than 0.05.

Prob.
0.0000

In the Hausman test, the null hypothesis is that
the fixed-effect model and random-effect model
estimators do not differ significantly. The test
statistic developed by Hausman has an asymptotic χ2
distribution. If the null hypothesis is rejected,
the conclusion is that the fixed-effects model is
better to be used and the random-effects model is
not appropriate. To perform the Hausman test, you
must first estimate a model with your random
effects’ specification as in Table 9.
From Table 9, the Hausman test statistic
calculated value is significant at a significance level
less than 0.001, thus, rejecting the null hypothesis
that supports the appropriateness of the randomeffects model and accepting the alternative
hypothesis of the fixed-effects model.

4.4. Hausman test for correlated random effects
With regards to the random effects and
the explanatory variables, it is presumed that there
is no correlation. The test that is often used to test
this presumption and to compare the fixedand random-effect estimates of coefficients is
the Hausman (1978) test.

Table 9. Correlated random effects
Correlated random effects: Hausman test.
Equation: Untitled.
Test cross-section random effects.
Test summary
Cross-section random

Chi-square statistic
18.308002

Chi-square df
5

Prob.
0.0026

Table 6 are used in addition to the results of
the panel estimation fixed-effects model using least
squares for determining the effect of independent
variables on DA in Table 10 as follows:

4.5. Total panel estimation fixed-effects model
To
test
the
hypotheses
and
investigate
the relationship between discretional accruals and
firm characteristics, the correlation results from
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Table 10. Total panel estimation fixed-effects model to determine the effect of independent variables
on ROA
Dependent variable: DA.
Method: Panel least squares.
Sample (adjusted): 2012–2019.
Periods included: 8.
Cross-sections included: 155.
Total panel (balanced) observations: 1240.
White cross-section standard errors and covariance (no df correction).
Variable
Coefficient
Std. Error
T-statistic
DA(-1)
-0.112131
0.114870
-0.976157
LNF_SIZE
-0.036711
0.014676
2.501460
FLEV
0.000208
9.98E-05
2.082727
FAGE
-0.001050
0.000526
1.995885
AUQUL
0.021471
0.023507
-0.913404
FSUR
-0.040453
0.062619
-0.646020
C
-0.466598
0.176496
-2.643674
Effects specification
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
Period fixed (dummy variables)
R-squared
0.310871
Mean dependent variable
Adjusted R-squared
0.203516
S.D. dependent variable
S.E. of regression
0.112468
Akaike info criterion
Residual sum of squares
13.55967
Schwarz criterion
Log-likelihood
1040.292
Hannan-Quinn criterion
F-statistic
2.895724
Durbin-Watson statistic
Prob. (F-statistic)
0.000000

Prob.
0.3292
0.0125
0.0375
0.0462
0.3612
0.5184
0.0083

0.022552
0.126020
-1.406922
-0.712856
-1.145896
2.194134

𝐷𝐴 = −0.112131235802 ∗ 𝐷𝐴(−1) − 0.0367110167692 ∗ 𝐿𝑁𝐹_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 0.000207815880251 ∗ 𝐹𝐿𝐸𝑉 −
0.00104955418841 ∗ 𝐹𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 0.0214713817013 ∗ 𝐴𝑈𝑄𝑈𝐿 − 0.0404532007801 ∗ 𝐹𝑆𝑈𝑅 − 0.466598118621
According to the panel estimation model using
least squares, it can be concluded that:
 The coefficient of determination (R2), in
Table 10, shows the value of the model to determine
how the independent variables can affect
the dependent variable (DA), which is equal to 31%.
This percentage implies that the independent
variables in terms of firm size, firm leverage, firm
age, audit quality, and firm survival explain 31% of
the total variation of the dependent variable (ROA).
A high R2 value may suggest a better fit for the model.
 The F-test is generally used to determine if
there is a linear relationship between the dependent
variable and some independent variables. Since
the value of the F-test is 2.8 at a significant level less
than 0.05, it is concluded that the independent
variables have affected the level of DA.
 The t-test is important to determine each of
the individual independent variables’ coefficient
significant value in the regression model. Table 10
shows that the most significant independent
variables for the model: FSIZE, FAGE, and FLEV,
at a significant level less than 0.05. This result
supports the Pearson correlation test discussed
above in Table 7 and helps in testing the research
hypotheses regarding the impact of the firm
characteristics on the DA. Accordingly, only H1, H2,
and H3 are accepted. The significance of the firm
size impact on earnings management is consistent
with previous studies (Hassan & Farouk, 2014;
Swastika, 2013; Khanh & Khuong, 2018; Matonti
et al., 2021) as it is easier for large firms to report
positive earnings changes than small ones. Regarding
the significance of the firm age, this result is
consistent with that of Akhtaruddin (2005), Alsaeed
(2006), and Gul et al. (2009), as the old firm has less
tendency than the new one to perform earnings
management practices. The firm financial leverage

has also a significant effect on earnings management,
which is consistent with Hassan and Farouk (2014),
Bassiouny (2016), Xu and Ji (2016), Anagnostopoulou
and Tsekrekos (2017), Asim and Ismail (2019),
Nalarreason et al. (2019), Teymouri and Sadeghi
(2020), and Matonti et al. (2021). The highly
leveraged firms would use the discretionary accruals
to have reports that are more attractive.
 The Durbin-Watson statistic test has
the null hypothesis that the ordinary least-squares
regression has residuals that are not auto-correlated.
This is tested against the alternative hypothesis that
the residuals are an autoregressive integrated (AR1),
positive
first-order
autocorrelation
process.
The Durbin-Watson statistic value ranges from 0
to 4. Non-autocorrelation exists when the value is
close to 2; a value toward 0 indicates positive
autocorrelation; negative autocorrelation is when
the value is toward 4. Since the test statistic value
(2.19) for the model is greater than dU, the null
hypothesis would not be rejected.
 For the Jarque-Bera test, since it is found
that the significance value of the test statistic
is less than 0.05 for the model (Figure A.1 in
the Appendix), then the null hypothesis (H0), that
the residuals are normally distributed, is rejected.
Since the Pearson skewness coefficient is less than
or equal to 1, or greater than or equal to –1
(–1 ≤ PSC ≤ 1), it can be concluded that the data are
not significantly skewed (Bluman, 2012).
 Theil’s inequality coefficient U is used to
measure the accuracy of the estimates of the fixedeffects model. Its value is between 0 and 1, where
0 shows a perfect fit. Since a value reaches 0.52 for
the model (Figure A.2 in the Appendix) indicating
the goodness of fit of the panel model, at a percent
of not less than 48% for the model.
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Table 11. Residual cross-section dependence test
Null hypothesis: No cross-section dependence (correlation) in residuals.
Equation: EQ01.
Periods included: 8.
Cross-sections included: 155.
Total panel observations: 1240.
Cross-section effects were removed during estimation.
Test
Statistic
Breusch-Pagan LM
15045.78
Pesaran scaled LM
19.13136
Bias-corrected scaled LM
8.059936
Pesaran CD
1.180470

df
11935

Prob.
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.2378

Xu & Ji, 2016; Anagnostopoulou & Tsekrekos, 2017;
Asim & Ismail, 2019; Nalarreason et al., 2019;
Teymouri & Sadeghi, 2020; Matonti et al., 2021),
as the highly leveraged firms would use
the discretionary accruals to have more attractive
reports. Then, there is another negative significant
one between the firm age, firm size, and firm
survival, and discretionary accruals (Alsaeed, 2006;
Gul et al., 2009; Hassan & Ahmed, 2012; Hassan &
Farouk, 2014; Khanh & Khuong, 2018; Matonti et al.,
2021). Audit quality has no significant impact on
earnings management, as the presence of highquality auditors does not constrain all forms of
earnings management (Piot & Janin, 2007; Alhadab &
Clacher, 2018). The panel estimation fixed-effects
model is then used to test the research hypotheses
and investigate the relationship between discretional
accruals and firm characteristics. The regression
results show that a 31% change in the firm’s
earnings management practice is explained by
the firm characteristics, which is to some extent
moderate but not so strong percentage. However,
it is a higher percentage than that of other studies
analyzed the same relation in Egypt (Bassiouny,
2016) before the Egyptian revolution and the new
changes in the corporate governance codes and
regulations in the Egyptian stock market.
However, this study has been limited by
studying the effect of only five independent
variables including the firms’ characteristics and
audit quality. This is because these characteristics
have been used the most in previous literature that
tests their impact on earnings management. As there
may be other existing characteristics that impact
earnings management and the level of R2, this could
be seen as a limitation to this research. Furthermore,
this research has concentrated on the non-financial
companies listed in the EGX, and it also eliminated
banks and financial institutions, because they follow
different laws and regulations, therefore, this could
be another limitation to this research. Further to this,
as the researchers could not access all the required
data, the research is constrained to organizations in
Egypt only. Lastly, as the researchers could only
access the disclosure book as a source of data, this
may limit the study because the last disclosure was
issued in the year ending 2019.
The findings of the study may help
the corporate managers to control the firm financial
leverage in order to avoid any earnings management
practice. This will enhance the confidence of their
investors, and it will improve the firm profitability
and the value of its shares. At the same time,
the stakeholders should notice such significant firm
characteristics (financial leverage, size, age, and
survival) in making their own decisions, especially
after the COVID-19 pandemic crisis, which may

 For the residual cross-section dependence
test, Table 11 shows the significance of BreuschPagan LM, Pesaran scaled LM, and Bias-corrected
scaled LM tests as the p-values are less than 0.05.
Accordingly, the null hypothesis of no correlation
will be rejected at conventional significance levels.
While the last Pesaran CD test is asymptotically
standard normal, and the null hypothesis of no
correlation is strongly accepted due to the test
statistic results at conventional levels, i.e., there is no
cross-section dependence (correlation) in residuals.

5. CONCLUSION
The earnings management practices can negatively
affect the financial reporting quality and creditability,
especially in the emerging markets. The information
asymmetry problem in the inefficient market
reduces the financial reporting quality in terms
of reliability, transparency, comparability, and
understandability. This problem can be solved by
enhancing the market efficiency and the investors’
confidence when the firms try to have high audit
quality and thus, offer more reliable financial
reports. Earning management practice, especially in
the Egyptian emerging market, may come from
the application of accrual base rather than the cash
base, which helps the managers in manipulating
the financial reports (Chen, Kong, & Wang, 2014)
through controlling the timing of revenues and
expenses recognition for a certain period (Shah et al.,
2009). The accruals proportion that managers opt to
report are called discretionary accruals (Gul,
Leung, & Srinindhi, 2003). Accordingly, this paper
uses discretionary accruals as a measurement for
earning management (the dependent variable).
This study contributes to the existing earning
management literature by investigating the relationship
between firm characteristics, audit quality, and
earnings management in Egypt, as one of
the developing economies for the period 2011–2019,
after the Egyptian revolution of 2011. It focuses on
investigating the main types of firm characteristics,
which are often used in previous literature, and they
are the independent variables: firm size, firm
financial leverage, firm age, firm survival, and
the firm’s audit quality.
The preliminary analysis of the collected data
was evaluated using descriptive and correlation
analyses. The descriptive analysis shows that 98% of
the selected companies are active in the market and
28% of them have their external auditors from one
of the top Big 4 audit firms. The correlation analysis
finds that there is a positive significant relation
between firm financial leverage and discretionary
accruals, which is consistent with the previous
studies (Hassan & Farouk, 2014; Bassiouny, 2016;
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expectedly increase the firm financial leverage and
in turn, some earning management practices that
can be used intentionally to make the firm be
perceived more favorably and look better.
Unfortunately, these effects have not yet been
reflected in the 2019 financial statements under
the study. The financial effect of such a global
outbreak of the pandemic has been disclosed in
the financial reports for the year ending 2020.
The regulatory bodies in Egypt are expected to guide
firms toward the best practices of voluntary
disclosures. They play a motivating role in this new
era of information disclosure.
Therefore, it can be recommended for future
research to study other countries and consider

other firm characteristics or attributes and other
corporate governance variables, rather than
the audit quality variable used in this study, like
cultural dimensions, that might have a greater
impact on the earnings management. The Egyptian
banks and financial sector can also be studied
for identifying other determinants of earnings
management practices. It is also recommended to
study the effect of the COVID-19 crisis on earnings
management and financial reporting quality, as it
was another important challenge, in Egypt, since
the 2011 revolution. The political and economic
instability at such two crises can easily affect
the financial reporting quality and increase
the management manipulation practices.
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APPENDIX

Figure A.1. The Jarque-Bera test
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Figure A.2. Theil’s inequality coefficient U (Part 1)
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Figure A.2. Theil’s inequality coefficient U (Part 2)
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